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A Decision Model for R&D Expenditures:
Some Remarks
Manne and Marchetti [lJ consider the following decision
problem: Given that each line of research has an identical
and independently distributed probability of success (l-p)
and the cost assoc:ated with each line of research is a
proportion c of the benefits B accruing if one or more of
the lines turn out to be successful, determine the optimum
number n* of lines of research to be undertaken in order to
maximize the expected value of benefits less costs. They
show that this number is approximately Log fC/- LOg pl.
og p
They also consider a sequential extension of this model.
It can be seen that n· approaches zero if (l-p) the
probability of success approaches either its lower bound c
or its upper bound 1. This is easily established. The
expected value of net benefits if n lines of research are
simultaneously pursued is given by f(n) = B[l - pn - cn].
The marginal value of an additional experiment when n exper-
iments arE-: being pursued is f(n+l) - f(n) = B[pn(l-p) - c].
This
[for
is a decreasing function of n. The optimum number n*
[
( c )]1/ Log r=- i
c < I-pJ- is given by Log pP where [x] denotes
!/The case c > I-p is uninteresting since f(n) < 0 for
n > 1 and hence the optimum number of experiments is-zero.
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the largest integer less than or equal to x. [Since for values
of p close to 1 we can approximate I-p by -Log p we get
that n* ｾ o.
Now as p ｾ upper bound (I-c) it is clearn* - Log ec/-Log pI] •Log p
LimAs p ｾ 1 also n* ｾ 0 since ｰ ｾ ｬ Ｍ ｏ
Log (l=P) _
Log p - O.
In other words it does not pay to conduct many experiments if
the probability of success is either too low relative to costs
(the case of I-p ｾ C from above) or sufficiently high (the case
of I-p ｾ 1). However, and this is important to note, in one
case the probability of success is very high and in the other
very low, even though the expected net benefits are being
maximized with few experiments.
The above argument leads on to a consideration of risk
and attitudes towards risk. The expected net benefit maximizer
is a risk neutral individual. In order to explore non-neutral
attitudes to risk, two approaches are outlined here.
In the first one, risk is measured by the probability pn
of none of the lines of research succeeding when n experiments
are being pursued. We then draw up a trade-off curve between
expected net benefits and risk. Thus, denoting the risk measure
np by n, we can express the expected net benefits
f (n) = B [1 - pn - nc] as a function of 1T by writing
f(n) = g(n) = 1 - n - c Log nLog p ( 1 )
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g(n)
I
i
/
!
n*
Figure 1
1 n
In Figure 1 ｷｾ have drawn the craph g(n) (which is concave
ｩ ｾ n) as a function n for the case -Log p > c (corresponding to
ｴ ｾ ･ ｣ ｯ ｾ ､ ｩ ｌ ｩ ｯ ｮ c < ｾＭｰＩＮ ｛ｾｦ -Log P ｾ c, the curve g(n) never
ｲ ｾ ｳ ･ ｳ above the horizontal axis and as such expected net
bEnefits ｾ ｲ ･ negatIve as long as any experimentation is under-
taken at all!] The point {n*)g(n*)} corresponds to expected
benefit maximization while the point {no,O} corresponds to
risk minilnization subject to the condition that the expected
ｮ ･ ｾ benefits are n0n-negative. There is a trade-off between
risk and Expected net benefit in the region (no,n*). As long
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as ･ ｸ ｰ ｾ ｣ ｴ ･ ､ net benefits are required to be non-negative and
the utility function of the individual is non-decreasing in
expected net benefits and ｮ ｯ ｮ Ｍ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ in risk, his choice
is restricted to the interval (n ,n*). Any choice of n < n*
o
will mean more ･ ｸ ｰ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ than n* being conducted.
In the second approach we consider an individual whose
current income is Y and utility function D(Y). The case of
o
linear U(Y) corresponds to a risk neutral individual. A
s:rictly concave (convex) U will correspond to risk averse
(loving) individual. We confine ourselves here to a risk
averse individual, i.e., DCY) is strictly concave in Y with
positive marginal utilities. His problem now is to maximize
his expected utili L.y. His utility will be U [Yo - Bcn] if
none of the n experiments succeed and U [Y + B - Bcn] if at
o
least one succeeds. . n nGlven the probabilities p and l-p
respectiv8ly of no success and at least one success, we get
the expected utilh;y as
Treating n as a non-negative real number rather than a
nen-negative integer and differentiating we get the first
order condition for maximization (for an interior solution)
of' EU as
(2)
,
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2
where Z = Y - Bcn. It can be varified that d E2 < 0 whenn 0 dn
dEdn = 0 so that we do indeed get a maximizing (in fact unique)
solution with optinJum n > 0 provided ｾ ｾ > 0 at n = O. This
I BU' (Y ) l
will hold as long as -Log p > ｃｾＨｙｯ + B) ｾ U(Yo)J > c.
Defining the ｾ ｡ ｩ ｬ ｵ ｲ ･ probability pn corresponding to the
solution far n from the above equation as n** and recalling
that the expected net benefit maximizing failure probability n*
1 c . dE 0equa S ---L--- we get on re-arranglng dn =
- og p
n** (4 )
Unfortunately,!1 even with the assumption of concavity of
U, it is not possible in general to conclude anything about the
relative ｾ ｡ ｧ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｵ ､ ･ ｳ of n** and n*. However, the expectation
that a risk averter will, in his optimum, choose a larger number
of experiments (i.e., lower n**) than the number n* (and failure
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｡ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｹ n*) chosen by a risk neutral individual, is borne
out if a quadratic approximation of U(Z + B) at Z is good
n n
enough. In other words let
U(Z + B
n
82
- G(Z ) + BU'(Z ) + U"(2)
n n 2 n
l:'(Z + B) - U'(Z ) + BUIf(Z )
n n n
l/B' t" 1 '1" f . J '
- Jy assuffilnr an exponen la utl lty unctlon ean-Plerre
Ponssard is able to show that n** < n*. See Ponssard [2J.
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Ther
'IT * * .-. [
U'(Z) + BU"(Z) 1
n ... u' (Z ｮ Ｍ Ｉ ｾ Ｋ Ｍ Ｍ ［ ｂ Ｚ Ｚ Ｍ Ｚ Ｍ ｕ Ｇ ］ Ｂ ｉ ｉ Ｂ Ｈ Ｇ Ｍ ］ ｚ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｉ Ｍ Ｋ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ［ Ｚ Ｚ Ｚ Ｂ ｂ ］ ｕ Ｂ ｩ ｔ Ｂ "T(;:;-zｾＭＱ ')Y-(n--:*:;;----;:O'.-;:S=--)J
Under the rea30nable assumption that IT* < 0.5, we see that
n·* < n* )r the riak averter will pursue more lines of research
than a ri3k ｮ ･ ｵ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｾ individual.
We can go a little further without making further assump-
tions about U. We noted earlier that a risk neutral individual
wIll undertake experimentation if and only if 00 > -Log p > c
ｷｮ･ｲ･ｾｳ for a risk averse individual these inequalities turn
out to be • > -Log P > C{UIYo ＺｕｾＺｙｾＩｕＨｙｯＩｽ > c. Thus if
f BU I (Y0) } ｾ
c) / -Log p > c, while a risk neutral individ-ｾ ｕ Ｈ ｙ ｯ + B) - U(Yo )
ual will ｾ ｮ ､ ･ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｫ ･ some experiments, the risk averse one will
not. -cThus, for values of p close to its upper bound e ,the
r:sk ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ･ ｲ will conduct fewer experiments than the risk
neutral ｩ ｾ ､ ｩ ｶ ｩ ､ ｵ ｡ ｬ Ｎ
Now as p ｴ･ｮ､ｾ to its lower bound namely zero, the
optimum number of experiments chosen by both types of individ-
uals tend3 to zero as is to be expected since with p close to
zero the probability of ｳ ｾ ｣ ｣ ･ ｳ ｳ of a single experiment is close
tc 1. We have established this result for the risk neutral
c2se already. For the case of risk avert individual, let us
first note that his choice of n for any given p is restricted
to (lTo,l) where lTo is that value of IT < 1 which yields
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E'J = U(Y
o
)' i.e., his choice of 1T (and hence the number of
experiments n since 1T = pn) should make him no worse off as
compared to a situation in which he conducts no experiments
and continues to enjoy his income of Y. Given that p 1S
o
-cless than e ,it can be easily shown that a unique 1T less
o
than unity yields EU = U(Y ).
o
Now
dEUap- -- pn Log p [U(Y
o
- Ben) - U(Y
o
+ B - Ben)] > 0
Hence as p decreases to zero, 1T increases to 1. This
o
implies that n** which lies between no and 1 tends to 1 as
p tends to zero or the optimal number of experiments n**
tends to zero as p tends to zero.
Now from (4) we know
n"'·
=7T"* r - n* U I ZnU'(Z + B)n
Giver. strict concavity U,
U(Z + B) - U(Z )
n n
U'(Z + B)
n
> B. As P -.. 0,
'11'* = -c -.. O.Log P
U' (Z )
Hence, provided U'(Z ｾ B) is bounded above,
n
n"·
n'"
< 1 for values of p close to zero. Thus, for values of p
close to zero, the optimal number of experiments conducted by a
risk ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ･ ｲ will be larger than the number conducted by a risk
neutral individual.
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The ｾ ｡ ｮ ｮ ･ Ｍ ｍ ｡ ｲ ｾ ｨ ･ ｴ ｴ ｩ model assumes that the failure prob-
aoility of each li,ie of research was the sa.me and independent
of others. It is perhaps more realistic to assume that there
is some 6rdering of possible lines of research according to
their (researcher'3) sUbjective probability of success. Thus
if n experiments are to be performed, then the first n exper-
iments in the ordered set of possible experiments will be
chosen. Ｚ ｾ ･ ｴ us maintain the independence assumption and
postulate that the probability of failure of the k th experi-
ｭ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｳ in the ｯ ｲ ､ ･ ｲ ｾ ､ set is
k-lP = 1 - ＨｬＭｰＩＨｬＭｾＩk , k = 1,2, .•.
ｷ ｾ ･ ｲ ･ 0 < p < 1 anrt 0 < a < 1. With the independence assumption,
tile probability of none of the experiments succeeding when n
experiments are performed is
TI
n =
n
IT Pk
k=l
It is easily 3een that a = 0 corresponds to the Manne-
Marchetti model. ｾ ｳ can be varified Lim Pk = 1 while Lim TI = 0
k+oo ｮｾｯｯ n
so that the probability of at least one experiment succeeding
can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing a sufficiently
large n.
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To keep matters simple let us confine ourselves to the
case of a risk-neutral researcher. If cost per experiment is
a constant proportion c of benefits B then he maximizes
expected net benefits as given by
H(n) = BLI - 1T
n
- cn]
Now
(6 )
H(n+l) - IHni = B[7T
n
- 7T
n
+1 - cJ ,
= 1T (l-p) (I-a)n
n
(7 )
Since 1T and (l-a)n decrease as n increases, H(n+l) - H(n)
n
is a decreasing function of n. It is clear that for the optimal
number of experiments to be at least one, H(l) > 0, that is
c < l-p, 3 conditicn identical to a similar condition in the
Manne-Marchetti model. Assuming this to hold, the optimal
number of ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｾ ｴ ｳ is given by n where
ｈ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ - H(n-l) > 0
=
and
(8 )
(9 )
It if. easily seen that n is approximately the solution of
or
H(n) - H(n-l) = 0
"-
n-l1T(n_l)(l-p)(l-a) = c
(10)
(II)
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We remarked earlier that a = 0 corresponds to the Manne-
Marchetti model. The effect of positive a on ｾ is easily seen.
For, an increase in a decreases both (l-a)n and nn for any
given n.
ｾ
As such n, the solution of ｮ ｾ (l-p)(l-a)n-l = c
n-l
must decrease as a increases. This is to be expected since
with an increase in a, the failure probability of every
experiment other than the first in the ordered set is increased.
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